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Abstract 
An important aspect of globalisation/Americanisation is, prima facia, the global export of 
televisual products such as Sesame Street, Barney, etc. that are explicitly concerned with 
cultivating elementary forms of organisational life.  Thus, it is surprising that 
organization studies has been virtually silent on childhood and pedagogy. This lacuna 
needs filling especially because the development of a post-national, cosmopolitan society 
problematises existing pedagogical models.  In this paper we argue that cosmopolitanism 
requires a pedagogy that is centred on the Lack and the mythic figure of the Trickster.  
We explore this through an analysis of children’s stories, including Benjamin’s radio 
broadcasts for children, Sesame Street and Dr Seuss.  
Introduction 
This paper is located at the conjuncture of a number of intellectual trajectories.  In the 
first section of the paper we discuss a curious paradox: children are very much the subject 
of and subject to organization, and yet childhood occupies a subaltern position in 
organisation studies.  This paradox warrants inquiry especially since the development of 
a cosmopolitan society – the subject of the second part of our paper – problematises 
existing pedagogical models.  In the third section we posit a pedagogy that is centred on 
the principle of ambivalence (the Lack) and the mythic figure of the Trickster.  We then 
explore these ideas through an analysis of children’s stories, including Benjamin’s radio 
broadcasts for children, Sesame Street and Dr Seuss.  
On Children and Organization   
While children may be legally excluded from formal organizations, a wider viewpoint – 
based on a broader understanding of organization – sees children as very much the 
subject of and subject to organization. Most children in the developed world are forced, 
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by law, to attend one form of organisation, the school, until their mid-teens. Even pre-
school children spend much of their time in and interacting with formal organizations, 
whether this be the local sport club or leisure centre, or the circus or McDonalds. From 
this perspective, the organizing that happens in formal organizations is but an extension 
and subset of a more general organizing logic that includes the organization of children 
and childhood. This perspective would lead us to the somewhat skeptical position that 
children are not so much excluded from formal organizations for their own good, but 
rather for the good of formal organizations (on the basis that children need to be properly 
‘cultivated’ before they can adequately contribute). A Foucauldian twist to this might 
lead us to see childhood as primarily about the production of docile bodies for use in (or 
indeed harvesting by) corporations. For instance Cooley (1987) reminds us of the 
emphasis that is placed on timekeeping in school and suggests that this is because of the 
corporate need for ‘time-disciplined’ workers who can perform their factory duties 
punctually and regularly.  More generally, the formal and informal curricula of 
elementary school is explicitly concerned with the cultivation of the basic forms of 
organizational life, such as timekeeping, organisation, teamwork, cooperation, goal 
orientation, task completion, etc. The micro processes of interaction in the elementary 
school system is where the values of equality, justice, power, social differentiation, 
hierarchy are first addressed and cultivated. From a political perspective, practices and 
values such as communication, decision-making, consensus building, reconciling 
difference, accepting authority – the very basis of democratic institutions, morality, and 
organizational life – are all first inculcated in the institution that is the elementary school. 
This perspective would suggest that far from the child being the Other of organisational 
life – i.e. falling outside the ambit of formal organisation – the child is actually centrally 
the subject/object of organizational practices.  Of course the reality is that the child has 
subaltern status within organisational life. This is well illustrated in organisation studies, 
which has been virtually silent on the topic of childhood and organisation, even though 
the field has an extremely catholic understanding of what is properly within its compass.  
For instance, while constructivism has impelled many to describe and analyse the 
processes of organisation through empirical studies, few of these studies have analysed 
what and how children learn, even though the practices that shape organisational life are 
themselves clearly a product – at least to some extent – of what individuals learned in 
childhood. Part of our agenda, therefore, is to address this lacuna and to shift childhood 
and pedagogy away from their peripheral positions in organisation studies.  
We see this shift as especially important in the context of the moral-political problems 
inherent in globalisation and, in particular, the acute conundrum of how to organise 
collectively when national identity no longer provides an integrating logic.  Drawing on 
Habermas (2001), this issue might be framed around how best to cultivate solidarity 
within a cosmopolitan collective.   It is to this issue that we now turn. 
Cultivating solidarity in a cosmopolitan collective 
In The Post-National Constellation Habermas (2001) poses the moral-political problem 
of globalization as one that is centred on cultivating what he refers to as ‘cosmopolitan 
solidarity.’ The specific context in which the problem is formulated is anomie arising 
from the individualizing effects of a “whirlpool of an accelerating process of 
modernization” (2001: 112) and the eclipsing of the nation state as the basis of social 
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solidarity. Over the past century and a half “the national basis for civic solidarity has 
become second nature, and this national foundation is shaken by the policies and 
regulations that are required for the construction of a multicultural civil society” 
(Habermas 2001: 74). The nation state can no longer provide the basis of social 
integration and moral authority, because, as Beck (2002) expresses it:  “the metaphysical 
essentialism of the ‘nation’ … inevitably give[s] rise to those consequences which made 
the 20th century one of modernized barbarism. Thus, someone who affirms and elevates 
‘his own’ will almost inevitably, rejects and despises the foreign” (sic) (2002: 38). In 
other words, the idea of the nation as the primary basis for collective identification is 
ethnocentric and exclusionary, as well as contrary to the experience of the hybrid and 
mobile subjectivities and identities in an increasingly globalized world. In the 
postnational constellation not only can this national basis for civic solidarity no longer be 
relied upon, but also it actually becomes part of the problem since the majority culture 
can no longer provide the basis for a national culture.  These two cultures must be 
‘decoupled’ and replaced by a multicultural civil society where “the solidarity of citizens 
is shifted onto the more abstract foundation of ‘constitutional patriotism.’ (Habermas 
2001: 74). 
The appeal to constitutional patriotism is not unproblematic however.  This is because the 
converse of Benjamin’s thesis that “there is no document of civilization that is not 
equally a document of barbarism,” is also true. Put differently, the metaphysical 
essentialism of the Nation, if it is the cause of barbarism, is equally the cause of 
civilization. As Durkheim had shown throughout his analyses of solidarity, morality and 
education, it is precisely the metaphysical essentialism of the nation, now disparaged as 
the source of extremism, chauvinism, and ethnocentrism, that is the very basis of the 
moral authority of the collective society, that transcends particular interests, that inspires 
self-sacrifice of particular interests and commands duty. Notwithstanding this difficulty, 
Habermas argues that constitutional patriotism can provide the basis of moral authority 
and sense of duty that transcends ethnic difference: a compulsory cosmopolitan 
solidarity.  
The task of cultivating a constitutional patriotism and a compulsory cosmopolitan 
solidarity delineated by Habermas and Beck echoes the problem Durkheim faced at the 
turn of the twentieth century, when, as Professor of Education and Adviser to the 
Education Ministry, he was assigned the task of formulating a secular morality to 
promote social integration in the Third Republic, which would counteract the persistence 
of seductions of sectarianism, monarchism and communism. But rather than formulating 
religious traditions as sources of barbarism – as Beck does of nationalism (Durkheim 
could easily have identified religion with inquisitions and pogroms) – Durkheim sees 
religious inheritance as the repository of morality, a rich cultural legacy, the resource 
within which a new secular rational morality may be found: 
We must seek those moral realities that are as it were lost and dissimulated in it. We must 
disengage them, find out what they consist of, determine their proper nature, and express 
them in rational language. In a word, we must discover the rational substitutes for those 
religious notions that for a long time have served as the vehicle for the most essential 
moral ideas (Durkheim 1973[1925]: 9).  
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Is the same not true of modern nationalism? The national society and its institutions were, 
for Durkheim, rational substitutions for religious morality. In the post-national 
constellation we must look for substitutes for the moral reality of national identification. 
The question Durkheim addresses in Moral Education – how to preserve and provide 
rational substitutions for moral ideals that have heretofore only appeared in religious 
guise – now applies to morality in the post-national constellation. It is not enough to 
throw the baby of modern secular morality – especially duty, the compulsory element of 
solidarity, which has up to now been institutionalised in national patriotism – out with 
the bathwater of the solidarities of national society. If nationalism is, as Habermas and 
Beck says, an outdated ‘barbarism’, then we must look for the forms of civilization that it 
has up to now enclosed. 
Durkheim’s analysis identifies three principles of morality dissimulated in myth and 
religion, namely, the spirit of discipline, attachment to social groups, and autonomy, or 
self-determination. To cultivate these principles of morality Durkheim advocated a 
curriculum emphasizing the teaching of Science, Art and History. Science, he argued, 
would ‘provide a sense of the real complexity of things.’ Echoing Baudelaire (1972: 51) 
who said, “painting is essentially a system of moral values made visible,” Durkheim 
argues that the study of art “could eliminate self-centeredness, opening the mind to 
disinterestedness and self-sacrifice.” History could “give a sense of continuity with the 
past and of the principle traits of the national character” (in Lukes: 117). The child, 
Durkheim argued, needed to be  
taught about the nature of the social contexts in which he will be called upon to live: 
family, corporation, nation, the community of civilization that reaches towards including 
the whole of humanity; how they were formed and transformed, what effect they have on 
the individual and what role he plays in them” (in Lukes, ibid.).  
Teaching the ‘principle traits of national character’ sounds rather odd today, of course, 
and Durkheim wouldn’t deny that. Moral education is historically contingent and 
culturally relative he argues, and he is trying to specify what is appropriate for his time 
and place.  
Habermas (1987, 1990) approaches the problem from a different angle, not through the 
analysis of the structure of myth and religion, but through the structure of language itself, 
and therein finds the basis of moral critical discourse. Habermas (2001) has conceded to 
postmodern theory that reason is de-transcendentalized, and situated. But, he argues, 
“from the correct premise that there is no such thing as a context-transcendent reason, 
postmodernism draws the false conclusion that the criteria of reason themselves change 
with every new context” (2001: 148). Thus, despite the assertion of paradigm 
incommensurability and local ‘rationalities’, universal pragmatics and the ideal speech 
act continue to be amongst the best resources at our disposal for the critique of ideology 
and for the evaluation of discourse leading to morally binding consensus. These practices 
allied to the concept of cosmopolitanism can, he posits, provide the basis for new, post-
national forms of citizenship or solidarity which could also incorporate an ethical or 
regulatory framework of rights that takes account of the new trans-national character of 
power. Habermas argues that what we require is a postnational system of global 
governance moderated by a cosmopolitan solidarity, or what he calls a ‘Postnational 
Constellation’ or supra-national regulatory body to complement other, multileveled 
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systems of governance, which would be rooted in ‘global’, cosmopolitan identifications 
rather than national identifications. Habermas’ ‘postnational constellation’, Beck’s 
‘cosmopolitan manifesto’ and Held’s (2004) ‘global covenant’ all merge this 
‘postnational’ version of cosmopolitanism as a bases of collective solidarity.  Each of 
these identifies cosmopolitanism as a system of global governance and formulates, in 
slightly different ways, versions of cosmopolitan citizenship.   
Cosmopolitanism as a basis for collective democratic politics is not without its critics 
however. In some ways, the contemporary discourse of cosmopolitanism illustrates the 
same problematic tendency towards totalisation as its ancient Greek counterpart, since 
cosmopolitanism in the Greek sense referred to not only the ideal of diversity or 
particularity, but also the ideal of loyalty to the universal, which in their case meant 
empire.  Calhoun (2004), for instance, argues that the unself-reflexive celebration of 
mobility and nomadicism apparent in many conceptions of cosmopolitanism presumes an 
elite social and occupational status and various material and bureaucratic privileges that 
are simply not available to the majority of world citizens. (i.e. access to good passports, 
easy visas, credit cards, airline clubs, etc).  As well, he argues, many theories of 
cosmopolitanism are based on an individualist social ontology and an elitist conception of 
identity as choice (which overlooks the lack of agency involuntarily localised or 
racialised individuals have with regards to their ascripted or imposed identities).  Because 
of this, Calhoun claims that contemporary ‘cosmopolitics’ are impoverished because of 
their tendency to falsely represent their particular standpoint and experience as universal, 
rather than particular, and are based upon a ‘virtuous deracination, a liberation from the 
possibly illegitimate, and in any case blinkering, attachments of locality, ethnicity, 
religion and nationality’ (Calhoun, 2004: 3).  To Latour, this is not only ethnocentric, but 
also anthropomorphic, for he argues that cosmopolitans have an impoverished notion of 
the ‘cosmos’ which involves purely the lifeworlds of humans, but not other aspects of the 
cosmos (Latour, 2004).  These contradictions and tensions between the particular and the 
universal are characteristic of the fundamental dilemma within liberal theory.  As Pollack 
scathingly puts it, “this revenant late liberalism reveals in a more exaggerated form, a 
struggle at the heart of liberal theory, where a genuine desire for equality as a universal 
norm is tethered to a tenacious ethnocentric provincialism in matters of cultural 
judgement and recognition” (Pollack, 2000: 581).   
If we could imagine Habermas’s theory of communicative action, universal pragmatics 
and the ideal speech situation as a project of moral education, we could see, like 
Durkheim, a pedagogy appropriate to addressing some of the central moral practical and 
political problems of our time: the colonization of the lifeworld and the problem of 
systemically distorted communication. It wouldn’t be too difficult to specify ways in 
which this problem would be explained and exemplified to children by developing 
inclusions to the curriculum – for primary school children even – of critical literacy of 
media and mass culture. For example, we can envisage classes exploring the ways in 
which the lifeworld, and the lifeworld of the child perhaps especially, is systematically 
targeted for colonization by corporate interests. Universal pragmatics and the ideal 
speech situation could provide teachers and children with rational formulae that would 
help them to defend themselves against such pervasive interpolation that is both 
aggressive and subtle. And this is not as far fetched as it sounds.  Good teachers, who 
probably know nothing at all about Habermas, see themselves already as playing a new 
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moral role as guardians of their classrooms from corporate invaders as they attempt to 
enable children to interrogate the truth claims of advertisers, control internet and mobile 
phone use and promote healthy diet.  
Mind the Gap! 
In his collection of essays The Making of Political Identities, Ernesto Laclau (1993) plays 
with the idea of “Minding the Gap”, the familiar announcement played continuously 
throughout the London Underground. The gap is dangerous, and we have to mind it, but 
though dangerous, the gap is essential and indispensable. Without the gap – if the gap 
were to be closed – the wonderful system of the London Underground, a hybrid fusion of 
bodies and technologies, a subterranean living sculptural representation of the perpetual 
mobile that is the modern metropolis, would grind to a halt. Thus, to ‘Mind the Gap’ is to 
be mindful of the gap: wary of the danger and the necessity; and careful of the gap – that 
we take care lest the gap be sutured. We find this metaphor of minding the gap useful in 
thinking through what cosmopolitanism means in practice.  The gap symbolises the lack 
between self and other, the difference that needs to maintained and respected.  
Alternatively, it represents the Lack in Lacan’s language.  
Underpinning both Durkheim and Habermas is the Kantian masterframe of 
Enlightenment reason. There must be a rational basis for modern morality.  Even when, 
and perhaps especially now as Habermas agrees, reason is de-transcendentalized and 
situated, it needs to be supplemented with other capacities and resources. An indication 
of where such resources may be found is also indicated by Kant.  One dimension of Kant 
that is somewhat undeveloped in both Durkheim and Habermas is what Kant identifies in 
the third Critique, the critique of Judgement, as that of “the pedagogical role of the 
aesthetic.” Aesthetic ideas, as Kant calls them – by which, as he elaborates, he means 
metaphors, allegories and similes, poetic, mythic and religious language – play a crucial 
role in transcending the limits to pure reason and practical reason. Aesthetic ideas, Kant 
says, have the cognitive effect of helping “to bring reason into harmony with itself” 
(Kant, in Coleman, 160). 
By an aesthetic idea I mean that representation of the imagination which induces much 
thought, yet without the possibility of any definite thought whatever, i.e. concept, being 
adequate to it, and which language, consequently, can never get quite on level terms with 
or render completely intelligible … Such representations of the imagination may be 
termed ideas. This is partly because they at least strain after something lying out beyond 
the confines of experience … no concept can be wholly adequate to them. (ibid, 161).  
 
For Kant, aesthetic ideas, metaphor and myth have an important cognitive value, as they 
give cognition greater depth and transcendence.  Moreover, the aesthetic idea is beyond 
representation, beyond conceptualisation, beyond language, and beyond intelligence.  
Thus it is dangerous, ambivalent, and unmanageable.  For us, a good term to describe 
what Kant is speaking about is the Trickster, always remembering that the Trickster 
represents that which is beyond representation.  Minding the gap means recognising the 
Trickster’s reality as integral to the underground system, and also recognising the 
Trickster’s potential to run amok, destroying categories and entities at will. We find the 
concept of the Trickster useful because sometimes explicit attempts are made to 
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concretise the idea – in, for instance, the role of the fool, jester, in the carnivalesque, in 
fairytales and children’s stories, etc. – and sometimes that which is beyond representation 
is, literally, left out of the picture.    
Humour is an essential part of the Trickster’s bag of tricks.  A joke works because, for a 
while, our present reality is disturbed as we are temporarily brought into an alternative 
world where codes, categories and rules are transgressed. The comic stimulus is our 
response to ‘getting the joke’, wherein we are re-assured of the existence and security of 
our present reality, but where we also recognise the potential for fantasy, for parallel, 
alternative worlds, for a space where the fixities of our present reality are absent 
(Koestler 1949, Westwood 2004).  Thus, humour is part of our way of playing near and 
with the gap, part of our way of ‘minding the gap’.  
The televisual Trickster 
Our difficulty with Durkheim and Habermas is that while they provide us with the 
principles of reason for a moral education that are crucial for stabilization and order, 
these need to be supplemented and fortified by the capacities for creativity, humour and 
cunning that are best represented by the Trickster. We can illustrate this difficulty by 
considering certain pedagogical broadcasts directed at children in the mythic age of 
globalization. Two of the most widespread are Thomas the Tank Engine, and Barney the 
Dinosaur. Both are ideological in the purist sense; they represent reality as a sutured 
totality. Both close down, rather than open up the notion of the lack, ambivalence and the 
sublime. While fairytales, horror stories and other aspects of children’s culture have 
historically functioned as expressions of fears and desires of childrens’ ambivalence, and 
their power lies in the capacity for children to triumph over their own destructive 
fantasies, in contrast, Barney is represented as a benign but clearly patriarchal authority, 
which quite literally ‘fills in the gap’ of the absent father in American society.  The 
popularity of Barney is perhaps related to the alleged ‘crisis of the family’ – in the US 
whereby in the 1950’s, 80% of all children in the US lived with both biological parents; 
by the 1980’s this had fallen to 12%  (Lipsky and Abrams, 1994) – yet, social institutions 
have been slow to recognise and support non-traditional family configurations which has 
resulted in a variety of ‘risks’ for certain families.  A recurring theme in children’s 
television and film culture in the US that reflects this ‘crisis of childhood’ is the fear of 
absent parents and the non-existent community, a theme apparent in diverse genres such 
as teen fantasy television shows like ‘Buffy the Vampire Slayer’, and in big-budget 
Hollywood family films such as ‘Home Alone’.  Barney thus is the resurrected ‘dinosour’ 
of the patriarchal American family,  albeit couched in a façade of multi-ethnic harmony, 
and reflects a nostalgic desire central to the ‘new right’ in America and the alleged focus 
on ‘family values’. 
Of course any analysis of Barney is subject to the counter-argument that it (literally and 
metaphorically) attacks a ‘straw person’.  Clearly the programme works hard at teaching 
children to recognise and respect the diversity that exists in the world, just as Thomas the 
Tank Engine reminds children that even in railway-land there are naughty and mean 
trains about.  Nonetheless, the overarching picture in Thomas is of a seamless network of 
integrated systems of communication and control where hardworking and dedicated little 
engines run around on a closed circuit, industriously performing routine tasks and 
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keeping the Fat Controller happy. Barney similarly represents a sutured totality, but here 
living children reduced to automatons take the place of the anthropomorphized trains, and 
go through their paces in synchronized, choreographed set-piece, song-and-dance 
routines, marching to the band, saluting the flag and munching popcorn. Barney purports 
to teach children “to use their imagination,” but Barney dictates both the content and the 
form of the children’s imaginary.  
By way of contrast, Walter Benjamin provides valuable directions on what is required to 
develop a ‘pedagogy of the beguiled’ in his essays on the task of the critic and the task of 
the translator, and from what he calls his ‘little tricks of the trade.’ In particular, we 
consider the pedagogy behind his series of radio broadcasts for children who were 
already being beguiled by fascist propaganda. 
Benjamin had a lifelong interest in children’s toys and books, and he thought of the 
adoption of the perspective of the child as one of a number of methodological ‘tricks of 
the trade’ for developing a critical perspective. Between 1929 and 1933 he wrote and 
broadcast a number of radio programmes for children. Thirty of these scripts survived 
amongst his papers in Paris. Benjamin was somewhat ambivalent about the status of his 
radio broadcasts. They were a source of income to him, and though he badly needed the 
money he tended to disparage this pecuniary interest and was somewhat self-deprecating 
about his work. On the other hand, when seen in the context of his larger critical 
conception of modernity in terms of the recurrence and amplification of myth, and the 
mass media as the primary means of dissemination and propagating mythic 
consciousness, his broadcasts to children can be seen as an exemplification of his 
principle of using myth against myth. Benjamin sought to use the very means through 
which the public, adults and children, were becoming beguiled and enthralled my 
commercial advertising and political propaganda to wake them up from their dream state. 
At the time Benjamin was making his broadcasts to children, the same airwaves were 
carrying, or soon would carry, the speeches of Goebels and the Furher. Against the 
background of the anomie of the Weimar Republic, disintegration, and apparent 
directionlessness, the mass media communicated a variety of hegemonic articulations that 
purported to identify the bases of solidity, stability and order. The myth of Progress 
through technology, the myth of happiness and fulfilment through consumption, the myth 
of destiny and historical coherence, the myth of identity and permanence of blood race 
and soil, and myths about the Others who were causing trouble, thieves of national 
enjoyment, decadents, demoralizers, conspirators, paradigmatically myths about Jews.  
What could Benjamin offer to children that might help to inoculate them against these 
influences? In Benjamin’s own terms his broadcasts might be thought of as little 
denkbilder, toy versions of his theoretical tools. In Wittgenstein’s idiom Benjamin was 
trying to give the children ‘tips,’ trying to tip them off, give them little pointers that 
would teach them good judgement. Let’s look at some examples of his klein denkbilder. 
Catastrophe, disaster, earthquakes and volcanoes are frequent themes in Benjamin’s 
broadcasts, evoking as they do the sublime, and awakening a sense of awe in the face of 
rupture, breaking open and unfathomable depth. In other words, the aesthetic images 
Benjamin selects for his stories literally and metaphorically open up the theme of Lack. 
One story, for example, concerns a catastrophe, a famous railway disaster in Scotland in 
the 1870s, when a train crossing a railway bridge over the Firth of Tay plunged into the 
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river, killing all on board. The train is thundering along through the darkness in the midst 
of a raging storm, and suddenly disappears through a gap in the bridge plunging into the 
river below. When it doesn’t arrive at the other side, and telegraph communications are 
lost, another train is sent back in the opposite direction, and it too, barely avoids plunging 
through the same gap in the bridge. Benjamin provides no elaborate explanations of the 
awesome disaster, and barely averted second catastrophe. The story hangs there, inviting 
interpretations, for example, how iron construction and engineering, the high bridge 
spanning the broad estuary, the speeding train, represent the modern ideal of Progress; 
the gap in the bridge, the precariousness and risk underpinning technology and faith in 
Progress, the break in communication that can have catastrophic consequences; the 
careful vigilance of the driver of the second train, who seeing the gap in time, averts a 
second catastrophe.  In contrast, the railway world of Thomas the Tank Engine fails to 
‘mind the gap’ in a paradigm that is centred on control, harmony, order and 
predictability. 
Another broadcast concerns the forgery of stamps – stamp-collecting being both the 
interest of the serious Collector, and a popular hobby amongst children, and a practice 
implicated in fetishistic consumerism. Benjamin relates how rare and valuable stamps 
have been faked, to a degree of perfection that even the best Collectors are duped. 
Accordingly, it became common practice that collectors only accepted stamps that had 
been postmarked, and thus certified as authentic. However, the postmark, the stamp of 
authenticity on the stamp, became a friend of the forgers, as the postmark could be faked, 
and moreover the postmark could be used to obliterate and mask any small imperfection 
on the forgery –the stamp with the stamp of authenticity may in fact be a fake. Moreover, 
good forgeries, exemplary pieces, ‘absolutely authentic fakes,’ then began to become 
collectors’ items in their own right, often with a value greater than that of the face value 
of the original ‘real’ stamp, and so the game goes merrily on: forgeries of fakes of 
forgeries and the erosion of the possibility of discerning the real at all.    
Another broadcast tells a “pretty story” about bootleggers during the American 
Prohibition era. The story takes place in a railway station near New Orleans: 
Young Black boys move alongside a train which has just come to a stop, concealing 
beneath their clothes containers of various shapes on which may be read in large letters 
“iced tea.” After signalling to a vendor, a traveller, for the price of a suit, buys himself 
one of the flasks, which he adroitly conceals. Then a second one then ten more, then 
twenty or fifty. “Ladies and gentlemen”, the Black boys implore, “wait for the train to 
leave before drinking your tea.” Everyone winks complicitously … the whistle blows, the 
train starts up, and all the passengers raise their containers to their lips. But 
disappointment soon clouds their faces, for what they are drinking is indeed iced tea.”   
 
This beautifully entertaining story is a Trickster tale for modern times, a tale of multiple 
layers of deception and self-deception, wherein the literal truth –“iced tea”, written on the 
containers – becomes in fact a lie. The lack, the indeterminacy of meaning, even when 
the thing is in fact what it literally says it is, means that it may not be what it is.  The 
story works on many levels. The white Northerners expect the black boys to be both 
criminal, and innocent; hawking illicit moonshine but at the same time simple 
straightforward Black boys. The white passengers are similarly ambiguous, they appear 
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to be respectable, law-abiding white folk, and at the same time eager to partake in an 
illicit exchange. The white passengers are sufficiently subject to convention that the 
Black boys can rely on their not drinking until the train is in motion. The white 
passengers ‘fool themselves,’ blinded by their racial prejudice that Blacks are criminal 
and stupid so that they cannot anticipate being outwitted by the boys. The Black boys 
emerge as the Trickster heroes, as they out-fox those who conventionally regard 
themselves as racially and intellectually their superiors, coming away from the encounter 
having profited from the whites’ prejudice, and having confounded their stereotype, 
while remaining scrupulously ‘truthful’ throughout. The story alerts children to the artful 
practices of Trickery, where things, even when they ‘do exactly what it says on the tin,’ 
may in fact not be what they seem. Truth, even literal truths, can be misleading. 
Benjamin tips off his audience of children about the trickery of advertising and 
propaganda, and at the same time he redeems the heroic virtues of the Trickster’s humour 
and cunning (as typical traditional tales simultaneously warn about and celebrate sly fox, 
who uses cunning, charm and guile to get what he wants). Benjamin’s ‘tip’ is designed to 
work as simultaneously a critique of trickery, while redeeming Trickster capacities so 
that children, and subaltern groups subject to power may need to appropriate for 
themselves. Referring to an incident that occurred not very long after Benjamin’s radio 
broadcasts, Zizek (2001, 89) relates the story of the residents of a small Jewish 
community in Romania who, when the Nazis occupy the country and plan to transport 
them to the concentration camp, organize a fake train with Nazi guards, board it, and of 
course instead of going to the camp take the train to freedom. A Trickster’s ruse that 
Hermes himself would be proud of. 
The task of the critic, Benjamin says, is not to give his own opinion, not to pass 
judgement, but to enable others to form their own opinions and make their own 
judgements (Benjamin, 1999, 548). In ‘Little Tricks of the Trade’ Benjamin says that the 
art of storytelling entails the storyteller not providing an explanation of the story, but 
letting listeners themselves explore the multiplicity of possible interpretations. In this 
way the story does not expend itself, but “preserves its strength concentrated within itself 
and is capable of releasing it even after a long time” (Benjamin 1999: 729). Such stories 
Benjamin says, echoing Aristotle and Heidegger, are still capable of arousing wonder, 
astonishment and thought after thousands of years. His children’s broadcasts are 
conceived of as enabling in this way. 
What would be contemporary approximations of Benjamin’s pedagogy? In his Program 
for a Proletarian Children’s Theatre Benjamin emphasizes the central importance of 
improvisation that “enables the child’s gesture to stand in its own authentic space”. “The 
kind of “fully rounded” performance that people torment children to produce can never 
compete in authenticity with improvisation” (Benjamin, 1999, 204).  We can see that 
even though Barney seeks to promote a sense of tolerance for difference and a sense of 
self-worth amongst children, it also annihilates ambivalence through the highly 
regimented, overscripted, almost militaristic performances of the very obedient child 
actors that precludes the improvisation that is so vital for Benjamin. Thus its latent 
content is clearly for children to follow orders and internalise the values of globalised 
capitalist consumption, for, despite continuous directives to celebrate our particularity, 
and to use our imagination, Barney represents the limits of the celebration of particularity 
in the absence of a positive version of collective identity, beyond nationalist references to 
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the American flag and a shared engagement with (or subjection to) corporate and 
consumerist jingoism.  
But even in Barney, the Trickster finds a way back in.  The child’s utopian gesture is a 
revolutionary de-colonization of the lifeworld, an attempt to reclaim the 
unpredeterminable space of the Lack and the improvisation that is the true form of play. 
This is expressed in the widespread practice of ‘killing Barney’. Tormented children, 
trapped in the asinine, cloying totalitarian state of ‘Barney’s Imagination Island,’ 
appropriate and invert the ideological platitude and sing: 
I hate you, You hate me,  
We’re a dysfunctional family 
Then a shot rang out / and Barney hit the floor 
No more purple dinosaur! 
Another example of a children’s television programme that does not contain the same 
cultural imperialism of Barney, but which involves a problematically harmonious 
multiculturalism is the programme Sesame Street.  Sesame Street represents a 
conventional classical liberal pedagogy following Durkheimian principles (Gettas, 1990). 
A recurring theme song is “Who are the people in your neighbourhood?” which 
articulates and celebrates harmonious interdependency and reciprocity of occupational 
specialization in the division of labour, the principle of organic solidarity. This is 
crucially important and indispensable for metropolitan multicultural society. But while 
necessary, it may not be sufficient. It has problems and limitations. For example, its 
inclusivity is ‘linear’, expanding to include a proliferation of differences and identities to 
a point where a norm is eclipsed, emphasizing the particularity of difference rather than 
the reciprocal interdependence between differences. This problem, represented by the 
recent elaborations of the cast of characters to be ‘more inclusive,’ more ‘representative 
of diversity’ is what besets programmes of multiculturalism: the categories of difference 
are extended infinitely on a diachronic axis, but there is insufficient synchronic 
integration. Difference proliferates as more and more discrete identities, but unity 
recedes. Second, this kind of pedagogy can gloss differences where there is no reciprocity 
or recognition and where there is intractable conflict. There is, for example, an Israeli / 
Palestinian Sesame Street (Mifflin 1996, Honig and Lampel 2000). Can we imagine how 
the elementary school anthem of organic solidarity might run there?  “Who are the people 
in your neighbourhood?” “The West Bank Settler is a person in your neighbourhood/ in 
your neighbourhood, in your neigh-bour-hood/ O, the Suicide Bomber is a person in your 
neighbourhood … a person that you meet/ when you’re walking down the street.. etc”!    
According to in Honig and Lampel (2000):  
The programs showed that the two societies could co-exist, but only by first disengaging. 
It was not a celebration of commonality, as CTW [Children’s Television Network, the 
production company] and Bernstein [the American producer] had hoped, but at best a 
respectful recognition by each side of the other's right to be different. What CTW 
discovered was that the concept of “separate but equal” which stood for segregation and 
discrimination in the United States, was precisely the one that found favor in the Middle 
East, where the right to be distinct and self-governing is the essence of self-
determination.  
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Thus, the name ‘Sesame Street’ has been changed to ‘Sesame Stories’ as it became 
untenable to depict Israelis, Palestinians and (more recently) Jordanians mingling freely 
in a shared space.  And while the original shows were built around the notion that 
erstwhile enemies could become friends, the ambition is now to help children to 
humanize their historic enemies through separate but parallel stories.  
Another example is the spin-off from Sesame Street called ‘the Best of the Muppets,’ 
which is no longer on the air but has recently been re-released on video.  Several of the 
Muppet’s skits are explicitly about the multiple ways in which existing structures of 
regimentation can be subverted, a message directly at odds with Barney’s smooth and 
linear performance narratives.  For instance, in one musical skit there are no words, but it 
consists of the interaction between a free-wheeling hairy, orange-haired, lead singer (who 
sings Mna Mna) and his two straight-laced and disapproving fluffy pink alien background 
singers (to which they respond ‘Do do do do do’)   Whenever he starts to improvise and 
change the content of the duet through jazzy vocal solos, they shake their heads and force 
him to start over using the accepted content.  In response however, he subverts the 
structure of the song by agreeing to the their format, but by singing the ‘proper’ words 
from very far away, sideways, upside down, by telephone, right up close to the camera.  
As well, the Muppets also contains a serious ‘high culture skit’ in which Fozzy bear 
pompously reads an excerpt “Stopping by woods on a Snowy Evening” by Robert Frost 
only to interrupted by a Mariachi band who were scheduled to perform at the same time.   
He responds to this by reading the lines “miles to go before I sleep” to the tune and the 
rhythm of the music played by the mariachi band, and thus illustrating a capacity for 
negotiation and improvisation in creating a new high/low culture hybrid which doesn’t 
exactly satisfy them both, but which allows both to perform.  The strength of this 
example is not necessarily in the representation of hybridity, but rather in the comic 
tension between these oppositional groups represented, and in the ongoing negotiation 
between them.  As well, these examples display rather than conceal antagonism, but also 
show it as an inescapable moment of cultural negotiation, but one that can only be 
overcome provisionally and temporarily.  The lack is not sutured here; rather it is 
continuously left open.  
For two other good examples we turn to Dr Seuss’s stories, The Sneeches and What Was I 
Scared Of? a.k.a. Pale Green Pants. In The Sneeches we meet two groups of creatures 
who resemble one another in every respect except that some “have bellies with stars” 
while the others “have none upon thar’s.” The star-belly Sneeches “look down their 
snoots” at the plain-bellies, and exclude them from “ball games and picnics and 
frankfurter roasts”, and the poor plain-bellies are disparaged and socially excluded year 
after year. Then, one day, along comes Sylvester McMonkey-McBean, a “fix-it-up 
chappie” with a wonderful machine, that (for a modest fee) puts stars on the bellies of the 
plain-belly Sneeches. As soon as the significant difference is eliminated, the former elite, 
the star-bellied Sneeches, want to reinscribe the difference again. So Sylvester 
McMonkey McBean (for an increased fee) puts them through a star-off machine. Now, to 
have a star belly is a stigma when previously it had been a sign of status. Things spiral 
wildly out of control: 
All the rest of that day on those wild screaming beaches 
The fix-it-up chappie kept fixing up Sneeches 
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Off-again on-again, in again out again 
Through the machines they ran round and about again 
Changing their stars every minute or two 
Until neither the plain or the star bellies knew 
Whether which one was what one or what one was who. 
Soon the Sneeches’ money is all spent. Sylvester McMonkey McBean packs up his 
machines and drives away laughing at the foolish Sneeches.  
Here is a classic Trickster (Monkey) who enters into a situation where there is latent 
animosity and potential conflict – racial and ethnic tension, colonial resentment. The 
Trickster’s inventiveness – his “wonderful contraption” – disrupts stasis and gets history 
moving. He stands at the centre of a whirlwind of antagonism and violence, playing one 
side off against the other, profiting from the tragi-comedy. Dr Seuss concludes the story 
with the Sneeches, bewildered, bruised and broke, coming to realize that maybe the 
difference between star-bellies and plain bellies isn’t so important after all. This tale 
warns of wily Tricksters, who, even though they do not actually cause trouble – the 
trouble between the Sneeches pre-dated the arrival of Sylvester McMonkey McBean – 
stir up trouble, which can quickly spiral into wild, screaming destruction. Dr Seuss’s 
story alerts children to the dangers of inequality and social exclusion and the latent 
potential for conflict and violence such situations engender. And it also redeems the 
creative power of Trickster. He breaks the historical stasis, the paralysis of relations 
between colonizer and colonized. Trickster sets politics in motion. But the outcome is 
uncontrollable, and it may as likely end in genocide as mutual recognition and 
reciprocity. 
What Was I Scared Of? tells of a plucky little fellow who ordinarily isn’t “scared of 
anything, not really,” but walking in the woods one night he comes upon “a pair of pale 
green pants, with nobody inside them.” He has encountered the uncanniness of the Other, 
an Other whose Lack – lack of a body, lack of substance, the unrepresentable Other, an 
empty pants, standing in the air. The Other is unfathomable: “what can a pair of pale 
green pants be standing in the air for?” Unnerved, he runs away, but over the next several 
days and nights has more and more encounters with this unrepresentable, unfathomable 
Other, who / which takes on an increasingly menacing aspect in the mind of the hero. 
Eventually, they meet face to face – or face to Lack: face to ‘empty pair of pale green 
pants with nobody inside them!’ The little creature screams, but then he notices that the 
pale green pants are trembling too – “it was just as scared as I was.” They are equally 
strangers and alien to one another, equally lacking, equally vulnerable. And Dr Seuss’s 
conclusion to the story is a remarkable elementary lesson in how to “Mind the Gap”. He 
doesn’t resolve the difference between the protagonists with a premature or false closure 
between the one and the Other. He doesn’t fill the lack by providing some positive 
content to “the pale green pants with nobody inside them.” He preserves the irreducibility 
of the otherness of the Other. He cancels the opposition, but preserves the difference 
between the two subjects. They become mindful of one another’s presence and the 
difference between them, and they interact with civility towards one another: 
And now we meet quite often, those empty pants and I 
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But we never shake or tremble, we just smile and we say ‘Hi”    
Every culture has its own repertoire of stories that give us tips about Tricksters and about 
how to ‘Mind the Gap.’ These stories are resources that may help us to mediate the 
antinomies of Law, Land and Longing. To conclude, let us look at one last example, a 
highly successful product of the global culture industry, a mass broadcast to millions of 
viewers, but unlike the previous examples aimed at the very young, this, like Benjamin’s, 
is a broadcast to older children and teenagers. 
In his radio broadcast Demonic Berlin, Benjamin praises the horror story writer E.T.A. 
Hoffmann, whose works Benjamin’s parents had forbidden him to read, and of whom it 
had been said the ‘the devil himself could not write such diabolical stuff.’ What is the 
good of such literature, which today has its equivalent in Joss Wheedon’s1 Buffy the 
Vampire Slayer and Angel, popular television shows aimed at the same demographic as 
Hoffman’s stories and Benjamin’s radio broadcasts? The pedagogical importance of such 
literature / broadcasts / television Benjamin says, is that it attunes its readers and listeners 
to the “satanic, ghostly, eerie and uncanny” as qualities not as it were ‘out there’, 
figments of the imagination “floating freely in thin air, but in quite specific people, 
things, houses, objects, and streets” (1999c: 324). By drawing attention to the haunted 
and possessed quality of what is taken for granted as ‘everyday life’ and ‘ordinary 
people’ through this genre of literature, children may learn to become “physiognomists.” 
Physiognomists learn the arts of scrutinizing faces and surfaces for signs of deeper truths 
and hidden realities: how, by looking at someone’s “face, their walk, or their hands, [they 
can] judge their character, their profession, or even their fate” (ibid). What is being 
cultivated here is the ability to make good judgements by paying close attention to the 
seemingly superficial and also the ability to see things from different points of view.  
And the Devil – the Trickster, is never an entirely unsympathetic character. A young 
physiognomist, analyst-exorcist – vampire slayer has much to learn from her demonic 
adversaries: “The devil – alongside his many other peculiarities – is also an ingenious and 
knowing fellow” (Benjamin, ibid). One of the recurring tropes in Buffy / Angel is the 
ambivalent and changeable character of vampires, demons and evil spirits. The 
protagonists are never simply ‘good’ and ‘evil’, but perpetually slide from one into the 
other: the ‘good’ ones grapple with the dilemmas of being seduced and drawn into the 
darkness (the character “Faith”, for instance), and / or conversely, ‘evil’ characters seek 
redemption from evil (“Angel”, the vampire fighting to recover his soul). Demons and 
Slayers, as well as the ordinary residents of Benjamin’s Berlin and Buffy’s Los Angeles, 
live in a state of permanent liminality in a world animated by mythic powers, and the 
quality of mind and the capacities needed to survive in such a world is not the singular 
point of view of rationality alone. Apollo’s baleful gaze has great penetration, but it has 
blind spots, and it doesn’t have access to a realm that lies beyond the limit of pure reason, 
as Kant suggests, a realm that is only to be glimpsed through aesthetic images. 
Knowledge and reason are necessary conditions of this quality of mind, but are not 
sufficient. Thus, the school library is the locus of much of Buffy’s preparatory work for 
vampire slaying. She and her friends must develop a mastery of history and demonology. 
                                                 
1 It is worthwhile bearing in mind, in the present context, that Wheedon’s political allegiances are quite 
explicit and public. He has been the leading figure in organizing and lobbying a Liberal and Left opposition 
to the Bush administration in Hollywood and in the entertainment industry in recent years.   
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They pore over ancient and arcane texts, and this enables them to identify and outwit 
their demonic adversaries, just as children today, if they are to be enabled to grapple with 
the zombies and monsters of Mbembe’s Cameroon or find their way through the 
labyrinth of smoke and mirrors and illusions of globalization, first and foremost need 
literacy, libraries, and public schools; they need the standard, modern Liberal education 
explicitly and implicitly called for by Durkheim and Habermas. But this will not be 
sufficient.   The devil’s greatest trick is convincing us that he does not exist. This is the 
great self-deception of Enlightenment. “The program of the Enlightenment was the 
disenchantment of the world,” yet “the fully enlightened earth radiates disaster 
triumphant”, because “the only kind of thinking that is sufficiently hard to shatter myths 
is ultimately self-destructive” (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1992: 3-4). A program for a post-
modern pedagogy of the bewitched, whether in the zombified post-colony or the 
beguiling consumerist phantasmagorias of the West needs new mythologies and a 
contemporary demonology. And the resources for this pedagogy are to be found in the 
indigenous patrimony of local folklore and Trickster tales, as well as in the broadcasts of 
the global culture industry. 
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